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The effects ofMergers and Acquisitions:
Evidence from China
Jiayin Huang
This paper studies 437 merger and acquisition (M&A) deals initiated by Chinese
companies listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1 997 and
2007. By examining the wealth effects and firm performance of Chinese M&As, we
attempt to investigate the underlying motives behind Chinese corporate acquisitions. We
find that shareholders of the acquiring firms realize significantly positive abnormal
returns in the short term around the announcement of the deal, contrary to most findings
in the U.S. market. Our results suggest that Chinese acquisitions are mainly driven by
synergy motives. Our findings suggest that, in the long term, the operating performance
of acquiring firms does not improve after the acquisition, although shareholders who buy
and hold the acquiring firm's stock realize positive returns. Furthermore, results of cross-
sectional regressions of abnormal returns around the announcement date show that
acquisitions by highly profitable firms result in reduced shareholder wealth, while
friendly acquisitions and acquisitions ofjoint-venture targets tend to increase shareholder
wealth. We find some evidence that industry relatedness increases shareholder wealth
which is consistent with prior U.S. studies. However, methods of payment, acquirers with
State ownership and cross-border acquisitions have insignificant effects. While Chinese
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1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the largest and most important
investments a company makes. These events provide a unique window into how strategic
managerial decisions are made that impact firm value in the long-term. Because of their
strategic nature and long-term impact, and the fact that these decisions constitute a major
operational and financial restructuring of the company, M&As have been the focus of
academic research for a long time and continue to dominate the research agenda even
today.
M&As have been studied in a number of developed and emerging countries. Our
understanding of how the decision making process that goes along with an M&A
transaction impacts long-term shareholder wealth creation, however, is largely based on
studies on M&As in developed markets such as the United States and the United
Kingdom. In recent years, researchers have also begun to focus their interest on corporate
control activities in emerging markets. Literature has evolved extensively over the last
few decades with numerous M&A theories having been proposed and empirically tested.
Three major theories have been frequently cited and are now widely accepted as
possible motives for M&As. First, the synergy theory, one of the most dominant M&A
theories, has been proposed by Coase (1937). The theory suggests that takeovers will
only be undertaken if the combined company is more valuable than the two individual
companies. Second, in contrast to the synergy hypothesis, research related to the
disciplinary motive argues that M&As are a source of value reduction. The model of
Jensen (1986) concludes that free cash flow is a source of value-reducing decisions, such
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as mergers and acquisitions. Managers are likely to engage in investment projects with
zero net present value with their own interest in mind. Likewise, Shleifer and Vishny
(1989) argue that managerial entrenchment increases agency costs leading to value-
reducing decisions. Thus, the agency cost argument posits that M&As lower firm value
rather than enhance operational and financial synergy. Third, Roll's (1986) hypothesis
about managerial hubris indicates that takeovers produce no gains to shareholders and
occur because acquirer managers make mistakes in estimating gains.
Although the classical theories suggest that M&A activities are driven by
economies of scale or synergy motives, substantial empirical studies associated with
M&As are not consistent with the wealth creation hypothesis as a whole. Loughran and
Vijh (1997) conclude that when looking at wealth gains as a motivation for acquisitions,
researchers have found three patterns: (i) target shareholders earn significant positive
abnormal returns in acquisitions, (ii) acquiring shareholders earn little or no abnormal
returns from tender offers, and (iii) acquiring shareholders earn negative abnormal returns
from mergers. Both short-term and long-term share price performance suggests that
corporate mergers and acquisitions are not value-enhancing activities, as is proposed in
the synergy theory as a motive for acquisitions. For example, Frank and Harris (1989)
examine the effect on shareholders' wealth for 1,800 UK takeovers for the period 1955 to
1985 and find that around the announcement date, target shareholders gain an average
return of 25% while bidders earn zero returns. Summarizing the empirical evidence from
more than 40 studies, Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that targets earn an average
abnormal return of 29% in tender offers and 1 6% in mergers; for acquirers the abnormal
returns are 4% in tender offers and zero in mergers. As noted previously, Roll (1986)
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proposes the managerial hubris hypothesis to explain the negative wealth effects for
acquiring firm shareholders. Evidence from Dodd (1980), Firth (1980), and Mikkelson
and Ruback (1985) regarding the announcement wealth effects for acquirers indicates
that agency costs and managerial hubris are the possible reasons for the statistically
significant negative abnormal returns earned by acquiring firm shareholders. To
summarize, most previous studies indicate that the most of the gains in M&A transactions
go to the target firms, while acquiring firms earn zero or negative returns.
Unlike developed markets, where studies and practices of M&As have been well-
established, the Chinese M&A market has just been beginning to emerge in the past few
years. From its modest beginnings and despite its short history, China's M&A market has
achieved enormous growth in the last two decades and has particularly accelerated in the
last ten years. In 1993, the China Bao'an (SZ), Shanghai Yan Zhong Industrial (SH) deal
marked the commencement of M&A activity in China. Since 1997, the number of
mergers and acquisitions started to grow in China, with a rapid expansion in China's
M&A activities occurring after year 2000, when M&As covered many industries,
including some cross-border transactions. It has also been documented that the number of
newly public firms created after a combination exceeded the number of IPO firms in the
same year. Thus, it appears that there is a growing trend that more and more companies in
China are choosing to go public via a mergers or acquisition.
According to National Statistics, in 2008, China's economy was the most
prominent among high-growth international economic entities in terms of its involvement
in the M&A market. Compared with the same period in 2007 in which China's M&A
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volume set a record high, the growth rate of China's M&A volume in 2008 was 20% and
reached US$167 billion. With respect to cross-border M&As, the involvement of large-
scale state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in M&As was about US$49 billion, a significant
increase of 74% compared with the previous year. By comparison, attributed to the
financial crisis triggered in 2008, global merger and acquisition volume dropped by
approximately 30% and set the lowest record of US$2.89 trillion since 2005. China is
beginning to be recognized as an emerging M&A giant in the global market. Enterprises
of China are no doubt making an impact in the global market in terms of maximizing
their scale of business, optimizing allocation of resources and enhancing performance of
management.
Research on the wealth effects of M&A in the Chinese market is beginning to
emerge. For example, Boateng et al. (2008) analyze the short-term performance and
motivation of 27 cross-border M&As undertaken by Chinese firms in the period from
2000 to 2004. They find that acquiring firms in China realize significant positive wealth
gains, consistent with the synergy hypothesis. Additionally, a more comprehensive study
undertaken by Wang (2007) reports that the performance of acquiring firms in the
Chinese stock market decreases after an acquisition. A recent paper by Chi et al. (2009)
studies the financial performance and characteristics of 1,148 M&As by Chinese listed
firms for the period 1998 to 2003. They find that during a period of 6 months before and
upon M&A announcements, acquiring firms realize significantly positive abnormal
returns, while the long-term abnormal returns (6 months) after M&A transactions are
insignificant. In addition to the wealth effects, they find evidence that the political
advantages of acquiring firms, interprovincial M&A and cash bids have an impact on an
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acquiring firm's performance. Although there are a growing number of studies that focus
on Chinese acquiring firms, compared with the evidence on M&As in Western countries,
our understanding of the motives, wealth effects and the performance of Chinese
acquiring firms is still very limited and sparse. As the market for corporate control grows
in volume (i.e. in terms of the number of deals and value of transactions), the need for a
better understanding of the determinants of M&As in one of the fastest growing emerging
markets will only increase.
The need for more comprehensive research on Chinese acquiring firms cannot be
overstated. Since the economic environment in China differs greatly from that in the
West, and China's M&A market is still at an initial stage, the underlying factors that
drive M&A processes and performance would differ greatly from those in the West. In
addition, given the increasing attention that China's economy has attracted from the
world, there is growing demand for research in order to help the world understand the
characteristics of M&A activities by Chinese acquiring firms with targets both at home
and abroad. It is also interesting and necessary to analyse and understand how the
classical M&A theories and motives developed in the West apply in the Chinese context.
In our paper, the motivation to examine the stock price performance of Chinese
acquiring firms stems from attempts to answer the following questions:
1. Do mergers and acquisitions create value for shareholders of acquiring
companies? What are the major characteristics of Chinese M&As?
2. Do classical M&A theories apply in China, and if so how?
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3. What factors, such as the method of payment, location of targets, industries,
and ownership structure of acquiring firms, affect the wealth effects of acquiring firms,
and how?
4. To what extent is the empirical evidence on M&As in China comparable or
different from the evidence in the U.S. and other developed countries?
We are interested in unfolding the potential explanations of the wealth effects of
M&As and the long-term performance implications of Chinese M&As. We believe that
our findings contribute to a better understanding of the workings of the corporate control
market around the world and the existing M&A empirical literature, with a special
emphasis on China's M&A market.
A large set of existing empirical studies of M&A activities considers the
performance and price effect in terms of target companies. In our study, since the vast
majority of target firms in domestic Chinese mergers and acquisitions are unlisted firms,
we limit our focus on acquiring firms listed on mainland China's Shenzhen and Shanghai
Stock Exchanges. We first characterise the main features of domestic and cross-border
corporate takeovers involving Chinese listed firms for the period 1997 to 2007 and
classify the acquiring firms into subgroups according to their method of payment, the
location of the target, the industry relatedness between the acquirer and the target and the
type of ownership. Then, we investigate the short-term and long-term share price
performance to examine whether M&As create value for acquirer shareholders. We also
test the long-term post-acquisition operating performance of acquiring firms. In addition,
we examine how the wealth effects vary across subgroups and undertake a cross-sectional
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analysis to investigate the factors that drive the process and performance of M&A
activity in China.
Using data on 437 M&A deals initiated by Chinese listed companies over the
period 1997 to 2007, we find that shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms, on average,
realize significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement date, which is
inconsistent with prior U.S. evidence. Moreover, our results suggest that, in the long term,
the market performance of acquiring firms exceeds that of the overall stock market. Thus,
shareholders who buy and hold acquirers' stocks for at least one year would gain positive
returns. On the other hand, we find that, in general, mergers and acquisitions in China do
not improve firm's operating performance. In particular, the improvement in operating
performance of acquiring firms only occurs in the announcement year but declines
subsequently. This result is consistent with previous studies on Chinese M&As (Wang,
2007; Feng & Wu, 2001; Wan et al., 2001). Our evidence on long-term operating
performance is consistent with some findings by Western scholars (Meeks, 1977; Ghosh,
2001). We find no significant improvement in performance from three years prior to the
bid to three years following the bid. The results of our cross-sectional analysis suggest
that Chinese mergers and acquisitions do not have distinct patterns. State-ownership
status and cross-border acquisitions have an insignificant effect on stock returns around
the announcement. Additionally, the results show that profitability before the acquisition,
changes in debt capacity, industry relatedness, friendly offers, and target status have
some effects on shareholder wealth around the announcement.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the related
theories and provides some background information on China's capital market. Section 3
derives the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the methodology and dataset. Section 5
provides the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
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2. Literature review
2.1. Theories of Mergers and Acquisitions
Research on mergers and acquisitions has been ongoing in developed capital
markets for a very long time. M&A activity serves as a catalyst in restructuring and
integrating industries in any market economy and leads to long-term performance
changes for the firms involved in such transactions. Given their importance and the
significant impact they have, researchers have been interested in exploring this
fascinating discipline of corporate finance from a number of different perspectives. Both
theoretical models as well as empirical studies have received their fair share of attention
from researchers.
In general, M&A theories can be divided into two categories. The first category
deals with value-maximization motivations in which M&A strategy is considered to be
the same as an investment decision with the expectation that future cash flows of the
acquiring firm will increase. The second category deals with non-value maximization
behaviour by the management of acquiring firms (Halpern, 1983). Managerial self-
interest and hubris can lead to non-value maximization acquisition decisions. Generally
speaking, existing theories and evidence suggest that corporate control through M&A
activity is beneficial for shareholders of target firms but not so for acquiring firms.
The synergy motive suggests that takeovers occur because the total value
resulting from merging the resources of the two firms is larger than the sum of value for
each firm. Put another way, firms are motivated to engage in takeovers because the
market value of the firm after merging is larger than the total market values of the two
firms prior to merging. With respect to the synergy motive in M&A, three broad
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explanations for the source of the gains have been identified: operational synergy,
financial synergy, and collusive synergy (Chatterjee, 1986).
The agency motive suggests that takeovers occur because managers of acquiring
firms attempt to undertake investment projects to meet their self-interest as well as to
increase their influence in managing the firm's resources at the cost of shareholders'
welfare. In line with the agency motivation, Berle and Means (1932) developed the
corporate control hypothesis which suggests that managers who control the firm, without
significant investment of wealth in the firm, make decisions at the cost of maximizing the
market value of equity to shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) further show that
when managers hold only a small portion of their company's stock, then managers as the
agents of the shareholders, have the incentive to make decisions which diverge from the
interest of existing shareholders. However, because the costs to restrict behaviour by
employing monitors and writing and enforcing contracts are high, managerial self-
interested behaviour exists in the form of substantial perquisite consumption or attaining
marginal performance at work.
In addition, the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) suggests that mergers and
acquisitions are value-destroying rather than value-maximizing activities, since managers
of firms with large free cash flows are likely to engage in unprofitable projects with a
small benefit or no benefits instead of using the resources to return the cash flow to
shareholders. The theory implies that such firms earn lower or even negative gains from
mergers and acquisitions.
The hubris hypothesis suggests that the net gain for the combined firm is zero. In
other words, takeovers occur because acquiring firm managers make mistakes in
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evaluating target firms. Therefore, the positive gains to target firms are offset by the
negative gains to acquirer's shareholders. As Roll (1986) proposes, the hubris hypothesis
provides an explanation for the occurrence of non-positive gain takeovers documented by
a number of empirical studies. Firstly, hubris hypothesis contends that managers of
acquirer firms who are willing to offer too much for their targets do so as they
overestimate the current market value of target firms. Secondly, the hubris hypothesis
implies that there are no gains for the combined firms because of acquirer managers'
incorrect decisions. Therefore, Roll suggests that, in takeovers which are the result of
managers' mistakes, the payment to the target indicates a value transfer from the bidder
to the target. Since the total gains are zero, any positive gains earned by the target firms
as a premium would be offset by a loss to the acquiring firms. It follows that the higher
the target gain, the lower the acquirer gain.
2.2 Empirical Studies: Evidence on Acquirers' Market Performance
2.2.1 Evidence on Short-term Market Performance
The bulk of research on the financial performance of mergers and acquisitions has
focused on stock returns around the merger announcement. In addition, majority of
empirical studies has been confined to U.S. and U.K. firms. The findings of prior studies
that have examined abnormal returns to the bidder firms of U.S. and U.K. are mixed.
Among the empirical studies on the US market, Morck et al. (1990), Loderer and Martin
(1990), Lang et al. (1991), Moeller et al. (2004, 2005), Masulis et al. (2007), Asquish
(1983), Schwert (2000) find zero or positive shareholder returns around acquisition
announcements. On the other hand, Franks et al. (1991), Mulherin and Boone (2000),
Andrade et al. (2001), Dodd (1980), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Healy et al. (1992)
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find negative abnormal returns around the announcement. Using a sample of UK
takeovers, Firth (1980) finds that bidding firm shareholders in the U.K. suffer significant
negative returns around the announcement date. Other UK-based studies, such as
Sudarsanam et al. (2003), report evidence that is consistent with the hubris hypothesis.
Conversely, Franks et al. (1977), Franks and Harris (1989), and Higson and Elliott (1998)
report a positive wealth effect for bidders on the announcement date.
Drawing on a review of more than forty studies that examine the stock price effect
around the announcement date of M&As, Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that
bidders, on average, earn zero abnormal returns. Bruner (2002) summarizes the evidence
of 130 studies from 1971 to 2001 and also concludes that bidders' return is around zero,
confirming Jensen and Ruback's (1983) finding.
In addition to the U.S. and U.K., a number of empirical studies have examined
M&A in other developed countries in Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia, among
others. In contrast with the general evidence reported for U.S. M&As, the studies by
Eckbo (1986) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) which investigates the valuation effects of
Canadian mergers and acquisitions during 1964 to 1983, suggest that for all deals in
Canada, both the acquirers as well as the targets realize a large and significant positive
return. Taking European countries as a whole, Goergen and Renneboog (2004),
Martynova and Renneboog (2008), and Faccio and Stolin (2006) document that acquiring
firms have positive shareholder returns, on average. In addition, Campa and Hernando
(2004) also present a positive return for European acquiring firms although it is
insignificant. By focusing on M&A deals by French firms, Eckbo and Langohr (1989)
report an insignificantly positive return for bidding firm shareholders.
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For their counterparts in Japan, bidders show a positive abnormal return around
the announcement date. For example, Pettway and Yamada (1986), examine the period
1977 to 1984 and find significantly positive bidder returns around the announcement
date. Kang et al. (2000) confirm the positive cumulative abnormal bidder returns with a
2-day CAR of 1.17%. To conclude, in contrast to prior U.S. evidence, previous research
on domestic mergers in Japan shows that acquirer firms realize a positive effect up to the
date of the announcement. This effect turns negative after the actual announcement date
(Van Schaik et al., 2004).
2.2.2 Evidence on Long-term Market Performance
Several studies have examined the long-term stock returns following acquisitions.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) document that the difference between short-term and long-
term returns results from the fact that long-term performance studies may be subject to
methodological problems. Martynova and Renneboog (2008) further conclude that the
magnitude of the M&A effect on the stock prices strongly depends on the estimation
techniques used to predict the benchmark return. A number of articles provide strong
evidence of negative post-merger performance. For example, Agrawal et al. (1992) report
significant negative five-year cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) relative to a
size and beta control. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find a statistically significant five-year
buy-and-hold return of -0.159 under a size and book to market adjustment. Meanwhile,
they document that M&As of all-cash bids yield positive returns, whereas equity bids
lead to significant negative long-term returns. In addition, Bradley and Sundaram (2004)
find evidence that the two-year post-announcement returns in takeovers of a public target
are insignificant from zero, but are significantly negative when the target is private.
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By contrast, two studies on long-term performance with regard to related and
unrelated acquisitions find positive gains. Haugen and Udell (1972) show that bidders
realize significant positive abnormal returns over the four-year period from both types of
takeovers, but bidders which acquire targets in unrelated industries earn higher gains.
Similarly, Eckbo (1986) finds that one-year CAARs from diversifying takeovers
outperform the ones from industry-related bids.
In contrast to the work on developed countries, studies on M&As by firms in
developing countries are few. As an initial empirical study of international acquisitions
by firms from a developing country, Malhotra and Zhu (2008) examine 96 cross-border
acquisitions by Indian firms in the period 1999 to 2005 and find that shareholders of
acquiring firms earn significant positive gains from M&A activity in the short term.
However, in the long term, a post-acquisition performance shows that the value of
acquiring firms decreases.
2.3. Empirical Studies: Evidence on Acquirers' Operating Performance
Several studies have also examined changes in the operating performance of
acquiring firms after an acquisition. Because the choices of benchmarks and measures
vary for operating performance studies (Barber & Lyon, 1 996) and the susceptibility of
accounting information under the different accounting policies (Stanton, 1987), the
evidence is inconclusive from the developed and developing markets.
For example, Healy et al. (1992) use post-merger accounting data to measure
acquisition-induced improvements in cash flow performance of a sample of 50 largest
mergers in the U.S. They find that cash flow performance improves following
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acquisitions. However, by adopting the approach used to measure long-term abnormal
performance by Barber and Lyon (1996), Ghosh (2001) argues that no evidence of a
performance improvement is found after acquisition. In general, U.S. evidence of long-
term operating performance tends to conclude that acquisitions are not value-maximizing
activities and that acquisitions do not lead to performance improvement. Other than the
U.S. evidence, by examining performance of 233 UK acquirers between 1964 and 1972,
Meeks (1977) also finds that profitability increased in the acquisition year but decreased
every subsequent year over a five year period. Similarly, Dickerson et al. (1997) examine
U.K. acquirer performance for the period of 1948 to 1977 and find that acquisitions have
a negative effect on profitability measured by the return on assets (ROA). However, other
UK-based studies on acquisitions in the 1980s (e.g. Manson et al., 1993; Chatterjee &
Meeks, 1996; Manson et al, 2000; Cosh et al., 2005; Powell & Stark, 2005) report
significant improvement in performance. On the other hand, for developing market
studies, for example, Rahman and Limmack (2004) find that Malaysian acquisitions
during the period 1988 to 1992 resulted in improvements in the long-term operating cash
flow performance from the increases in return on sales and in asset turnover.
Ramakrishnan (2008) studies 414 mergers between 1993 and 2005 in India and finds that
mergers in India lead to an improvement in post-acquisition operating performance as
measured by operating cash flows.
2.4. Evidence on Chinese M&A Activity
During the last decade, with the rapid growth of China's economy, there has been
a growth in the amount of published work on the Chinese market in an attempt to explore
the performance and characteristics of M&A activities in this rapidly emerging market.
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The findings in these studies provide us with the initial insight on the implications and
performance of M&As by Chinese firms. However, the research and our understanding of
the corporate control market in China still lags significantly when compared with the vast
body of knowledge for developed markets. Most China-based M&A studies have
examined the cross-border M&As through which firms in developed countries have
invested in the Chinese market directly.
Research on the motives and performance of Chinese acquirers is beginning to
emerge. For instance, the work of Boateng et al. (2008) is believed to be the initial
empirical analysis on the motives and performance of Chinese cross-border M&As.
Using a sample of 27 Chinese cross-border M&As during the period 2000 to 2004, they
test the short-term performance of Chinese acquiring firms by examining the abnormal
returns. They conclude that cross-border M&As create value for Chinese acquiring firms.
In addition, Wang (2007) takes the first step to search for motives and effectiveness of
Chinese mergers and acquisitions by analyzing the relationship between corporate
governance, earnings management and the performance, and valuation of acquiring firms.
This study was carried out using a sample of 618 acquisitions by Chinese listed
companies. The results show that M&As by Chinese listed firms are mainly driven by the
agency or hubris motive.
Chi et al. (2009) consider the performance and characteristics of 1 148 M&As on
the two Chinese stock exchanges from 1998 to 2003. The study finds that during a period
of 6 months before and upon the M&A announcement, acquiring firms realize significant
positive abnormal returns, while the long-term abnormal returns (6 months) after the
M&A announcement are insignificant. The result of their cross-sectional analysis shows
16
that the political advantages of acquiring firms, cross-province M&As and cash bids have
positive impact on acquiring firms' performance. Finally, the authors conclude that the
profitability change of acquiring firms before and after the merger shows that the
acquisition does not improve the fundamentals of Chinese acquiring firms, at least not in
the short-run.
Results on the long-term operating performance are mixed. Operating
performance increases in the announcement year and the next year but then decreases in
the following years as documented by Feng and Wu (2001) and Wan et al. (2001). By
using and comparing eleven operating performance indicators, Wang (2007) concludes
that the operating performance of acquiring firms decreases significantly after the
acquisition, especially in the long-term.
2.5. Background of China's Capital Market
China's capital market is an emerging market. It has been formed by the re-
establishment of its two stock markets, the Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in July 1991.
To date, in addition to the two stock exchanges, there are three commodity futures
exchanges (the Dalian Commodity Exchange, the Shanghai Future Exchange, and the
Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange) and one financial future exchange (the China
Financial Future Exchange) in China. Meanwhile, there are securities such as stocks
(namely, ?-shares, B-shares and ?-shares, etc.), bonds (T-bonds, corporate bonds,
enterprise bonds, and convertible bonds), securities investment funds, warrants and
commodity futures available in this emerging market.
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Although China's capital market is a relatively new one, during the past two
decades, the size of the market has expanded rapidly and dramatically, the regulatory
system has continued to improve and the market participants have become gradually
more experienced. So far, its stock market ranks second in Asia following the Japanese
market. At the end of 2007, there were 1,550 companies with 2,241.7 trillion common
shares traded on China's two stock exchanges, nearly 30 times more than the number of
companies traded in 1992. At the end of 2007, the market capitalization reached RMB
32.71 trillion (USD 4.33 trillion), an increase of 265% from the end of 2006. By that
time, China's stock market ranked third in the world by market capitalization.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is China's central
regulatory body established in October, 1992. It is authorized to supervise and regulate
the Chinese securities markets in accordance with the law. Since 1992, the functions of
CSRC have been strengthened and clarified gradually along with the reform of China's
securities regulatory system. The main functions of CSRC are as follows. First, it builds
up a direct leadership over securities markets by establishing a centralised supervisory
system for China's securities markets. Second, it supervises the market participants by
formulating market policies and standards. Third, it is obligated to increase the ability to
prevent financial crisis.
As we know, China's market has its unique features compared with its Western
counterparts. Prior to 1978, SOE existed for a long time as the unique form of Chinese
enterprises under the planned economy. Since 1978, a year that marked the transition of
China's economy from planned to market-oriented, China's SOEs has been transformed
significantly. Since 1978, SOEs reforms have experienced three successful phases. First,
18
the Chinese government authorized managers of SOEs more autonomy to pursue firm's
profit and growth. Second, company's ownership and management have been gradually
separated so that managers are responsible for Companys' profits and losses as well.
Third, large-scale SOEs are being transformed into modern corporations. In the third
phase, some of the largest SOEs listed on Chinese Stock Exchanges, although the State
still hold two-third of the shares in the listed firms. By the end of 2007, more than 75% of
the listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were SOEs.
China's stock market has other distinct features. First, China's common stocks are
classified into ?-shares, B-shares and H-shares. ?-shares and B-shares are issued and
traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Trading of ?-shares is in
Chinese currency and restricted only to domestic investors, while B-shares are traded and
subscribed in foreign currencies and available only to foreign investors. The ?-shares are
issued and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for all investors worldwide, except
for those who hold a Chinese passport.
Second, the Chinese stock market has a unique share ownership structure. Under
China's special share segmentation system, most of the listed companies have three
categories of shares: State-owned shares, which are held by the State or State controlled
companies, legal person shares, which are held by a corporation, and ?-shares or B-
shares held largely by individuals which are tradable shares on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. By the end of 2004, only about one-third of the shares of a
listed company were freely traded as ?-shares or B-shares on China's stock exchanges.
The remaining two-thirds of the shares were non-tradable shares held by both the State
and the legal-person shareholders. In recent years, the non-tradable shares of listed
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companies have decreased sharply due to the large-scale reform on non-tradable shares
initiated by CSRC since 2005. As of 2007 year end, 98% of total listed companies had
either initiated or completed the reform on non-tradable shares. Furthermore, since mid-
2006, all new IPOs on Chinese stock exchanges do not have non-tradable shares any
longer. The world has witnessed China's efforts to gradually turn its capital market into
one that is fundamentally consistent with international standards in terms of its legal
framework, regulatory regime, and trading regulations.
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3. Hypotheses
We consider the unique characteristics of the Chinese capital market and share
ownership structure of listed firms to construct our hypotheses. One of the major goals in
this study is to identify the motives for M&As by Chinese listed companies and factors
that may affect the wealth effects of acquiring firms.
Common hypotheses relating to M&A motives include synergy, agency and
hubris (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). Arguments based on synergy posit that M&As
are value maximizing transactions for acquirers. Studies that support this hypothesis are
Maquieira et al. (1998) and Andrade et al. (2001), among others. They conclude that
M&As create value on behalf of the shareholders of the combined firms. On the other
hand, M&As driven by the agency motive increase the self-interest of the management in
the acquiring firms at the cost of shareholders of acquirers. At the same time, the hubris
hypothesis suggests that M&As are value decreasing transactions due to the
overestimation of target firms' value by the acquirer.
Based on the prevalent theories regarding M&A motives, our first hypothesis tests
these competing arguments of M&As. If mergers and acquisitions announced by Chinese
acquirers are driven by the synergy motive, the stock price and financial performance of
acquiring firms will increase significantly after the deal. On the other hand, if
acquisitions by Chinese acquirers are driven by the agency motive, managers may be
motivated to engage in these transactions to maximize firm size. Under this motive, the
performance of the acquiring firm will not improve after the M&A transaction even
though the size of the acquiring firm will increase. Finally, if M&As are motivated by
managerial hubris, management's overestimation of the target's value will lead to a loss
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in value for the acquiring firms and their stock price and financial performance will
decrease after the deal.
3.1. Means of Payment
The means used to pay for an acquisition is often used as an indicator of the
acquirer's confidence in the value of the deal. Acquirers are more likely to value the deal
fairly and are less likely to overpay for the target when paying by cash rather than stock.
Travlos (1987) examines the abnormal returns of acquiring firms in mergers and tender
offers associated with different methods of payments. His findings suggest that the
method of payment could signal important information to the market about the existence
of information asymmetries. In particular, acquiring firms in cash offers realize positive
returns or at least normal returns around the announcement period, while acquiring firms
in stock offers suffer negative returns. Furthermore, according to the signaling hypothesis
(Myers & Majluf, 1984), the choice of cash payment by bidder management reveals that
they believe their firm is undervalued, while the choice of stock exchange conveys the
negative information that the stock price of the bidding firm is overvalued.
Therefore, we expect that for Chinese listed acquirers, cash payment has a
positive impact on their cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement
period and the positive effect is stronger than other means of payment such as stock
offers or mixed offers (cash and stock).
3.2. Ownership Structure
The Chinese economy has undergone a significant transformation since 1978.
Before the reforms were put in place, all companies belonged to the government, so
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called purely state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Then, in the course of economic reform,
the ownership structure of Chinese firms started to change with the result that today we
have state-owned, collective-owned, privately-owned, individually-owned, cooperative or
joint-ventured, and foreign-owned firms. Although, there are various types of ownership
today, SOEs remain the core sector of the Chinese economy and play a dominant role in
China's rapid development. In addition, compared to their counterparts in Western
countries, most listed firms in China have a single dominant shareholder whose
ownership far exceeds that of the second largest shareholder. This, no doubt, exerts a
significant influence on long-term strategic investment decisions such as acquisitions.
Existing evidence suggests that the ownership structure of Chinese firms affects
firm performance. By conducting an in-depth examination of the relation between the
ownership structures and firm's performance in China, Chen et al. (2009) conclude that
the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling
shareholder. Central government controlled firms perform the best, while privately
controlled firms perform worst. In addition, Chi et al. (2009) examine the ownership
hypothesis on Chinese listed acquiring firms and find that the higher state ownership and
stronger government connections of acquiring firms have a significant positive impact on
market performance.
Therefore, based on the special impact state-owned firms may have on M&As, we
predict that the share price and market performance of state-owned acquirers will
outperform that of corporate non-state acquirers.
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3.3. Industry Effects
A horizontal transaction between the acquirer and the target is assumed to
increase the average shareholder wealth for acquiring firms (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2009;
Travlos, 1987). Besides, Jensen (1988, 1994) proposes that corporate takeover is an
efficient approach for industry structure to respond to the economic changes. Thus we
predict that if the acquiring and target firms belong to the same industry before the M&A
transaction, it will result in a higher positive price reaction upon and after the M&A
announcement.
3.4. Cross-Border Acquisitions
In general, prior literature documents that a cross-border M&A transaction helps
acquiring firms exploit specific resources in the outward market and acquiring firms
benefit from the integration of diversification and organizational capacity (Morck &
Yeung, 1992; Kang, 1993). In other words, cross-border acquisitions create value for
acquiring firms' shareholders. On the other hand, there is evidence that shows a negative
performance for acquiring firms involved in cross-border M&As around the
announcement period (Mathur et al., 1994).
As the first cross-border study for Chinese acquiring firms, Boateng et al. (2008)
report significant positive abnormal returns for Chinese bidders and conclude that cross-
border M&As create value for Chinese acquiring firms. With regard to the Chinese
economic reform policies, Chinese firms are encouraged to seek outward investment
opportunities and the government provides those acquiring firms involved in cross-border
M&As with prominent capital support and resources.
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Since the majority of listed firm are state-owned and these firms are far more
likely to be encouraged by the government to seek investment opportunities abroad, we
hypothesize that cross-border M&As create value for shareholders of acquiring firms
both in the short-term and in the long term.
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4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data Description
4.1.1 Data Collection
First, our initial M&A sample data is drawn from the Thomson Financial SDC
Platinum Merger and Acquisition Database using the following criteria:
1 . The acquirers are publicly listed firms located in mailand China only;
2. The announcement date of the acquisition lies between Jan. 1, 1997 and Dec. 31, 2007;
and
3. The M&A deals are listed as completed transactions.
Following the criteria above, the initial sample data of overall M&A transactions
announced by Chinese listed acquiring firms consists of 818 completed deals. At the
same time, we collect a number of deal-specific data items from the SDC Mergers and
Acquisitions Database, including the announcement date, the effective date, the target's
name, its status (subsidiary, joint venture partner, private, government-owned or public
firms), its industrial classification described by 4-digit SIC code and its nation, the
acquirer's name, its stock ticker and its 4-digit SIC code. We also collect data such as the
percentage of shares acquired, the percentage of shares owned after the acquisition, the
means of payment offered (cash only, stock only, cash and stock or asset, etc.), the form
of acquisition (merger, acquisition of major interest or acquisition of assets), the bidder's
attitude (friendly or neutral) and the value of the transaction, if disclosed.
Next, since we are only interested in the impact of M&A announcements where
the acquiring firm obtains controlling rights after the acquisition, we exclude firms
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involved in less than 50% stake in a target firm in the initial sample. Our sample size
drops to 497 after this screening process. Furthermore, we only consider acquiring firms
which make an acquisition announcement for a single target on the same date during our
studied period. For acquiring firms that initiate multiple acquisition on the same date, we
keep only one M&A announcement in our sample. Following this selection, 60 deals are
excluded from our sample. We are left with a sample of 437 completed domestic and
cross-border deals initiated by Chinese listed firms.
Second, in order to conduct an event study, we information on the dividend-
adjusted daily stock price for all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges and daily price data of the Shanghai SE Composite index and Shenzhen SE
Composite index, both of which are value-weighted indexes from the Bloomberg
Database. The daily stock returns and daily market returns are calculated as follows:
R ^iSi=S. (1)
pm(t-l)Rmt = Tm(H (2)
Where Rt is the stock return for stock i on day t, Rm, is the return of the market on
day t, P, is the daily stock price of stock / on day /, Pmt is the daily price of the market on
day /, P,-i is the daily stock price of stock i on day t-J, and Pm(t.i) is the daily price of the
market on day t-1.
Third, we obtain the firms' annual financial data mainly from Annual Reports of
Listed Companies in China and the Statistics Year Book issued by the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and China Listed Companies Reports issued by China Cheng
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Xin Securities Rating Company Ltd. Also, we obtain data from two stock exchanges'
websites, and China's Security Regulatory Community (CSRC) website.1
4.1.2 Summary statistics of Chinese M&A characteristics
Table 1 provides a yearly distribution of our sample of 437 M&A deals initiated
by Chinese listed firms between 1997 to 2007, partitioned into seven categories. In
general, the total number of M&A transactions each year increased from 1997 to 2007
and peaked in 2007. From Table 1 we notice that, before 2000, there were few
acquisitions by Chinese listed firms. Subsequently, the Chinese M&A market started to
grow fairly rapidly. For example, the number of M&A deals in 2003 exceeded the total
number of deals between 1997 and 2001. Although the number of transactions decreased
sharply in 2005 when the Chinese capital market experienced a significant downturn, it
recoverd back in 2007 with nearly one fourth of our total sample size. As Panel A in
Table 1 shows, two-thirds of M&A deals involved cash payment. Very few transactions
were paid by stock. Although there are many deals for which specific means of payment
could not be identified, evidence from the available data allows us to conclude that cash
is a dominant method of payment employed by Chinese acquiring firms.
Panel B in Table 1 shows that state-owned firms take part in M&A activities
twice as often as non state-owned firms do. We also note that none of our sample firms
has a hostile takeover. Panel C shows that the vast majority are friendly acquisitions and
neutral acquisitions. This is related to China's M&A charateristic that Chinese listed
firms tend to acquire targets which are subsidiaries or privately owned firms (see Panel G
1 Shanghai Stock Exchange website: www.sse.com.cn;
Shenzhen Stock Exchange website: www.szse.cn;
CSRC website: www.csrc.gov.cn
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in Table 1). In our sample, targets as subsidiaries of another company are the most
common participant in M&As and private targets is second most common. As we know,
if a target is privately held, an acquirer often deals with its private owner directly. If a
target is a wholly owned subsidiary of another firm, the acquisition negotiation is often
between the acquirer and the target's parent. This perhaps explains the lack of hostile
tender offers in the Chinese M&A market.
Panel F in Table 1 presents information on the industry relatedness which is
identified by the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) between the acquirer and
target. Chinese firms appear to acquire targets in the same industry. This evidence
indicates that most Chinese firms attempt to gain economies of scale and expand their
market share by corporate control in the same industry. In addition, acquisitions of major
interests (301) are the dominant form of acquisition in our sample. Because the
acquisition of major interests is less complicated than mergers and assets acquisition, the
relatively small number of mergers (74) and assets acquisitions (57) shown in Panel E of
Table 1 could be because they are not simple to execute.
From Panel A of Table 2, we find that between January 1997 and December 2007,
333 M&A transactions with a total value of RMB 13,477.78 mil (USD 1,845.1 1 million)
were initiated by Chinese acquiring firms. As shown in Panel B, state-owned acquiring
firms were responsible for about 75% of the entire transaction value. As for non-SOE
firms, they appear to be relatively small firms with low profitatility but with a high
growth rate engaged in smaller deals. In additon, compared with other groups, non-SOE
acquiring firms have a high debt capacity. Panel C shows that although the transaction
value of cross-border M&As only accounted for about 1 8.5% of total transaction value in
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our study period, it has the largest average transaction value for each deal, RMB 226.74
million (USD 3 1 .04 million). Firms which engage in cross-border M&As are relatively
large size firms with high profitability but low growth rates.
4.2. Methodology
4.2.1 Measurement of Market Performance of Acquiring Firms
In this study, to measure market performance, we employ Cumulative Abnormal
Returns (CARs) to measure short-term stock performance and Buy-and-Hold Abnormal
Returns (BHARs) to measure long-term stock performance. Following the estimation
period and event windows employed by Schwert (1996), CARs of acquiring firms are
calculated over the event window from 42 days prior to the announcement date to 126
days after. We further break down the long event window into 12 windows including (-
5,-2), (-2,0), (-1,0), (0,0), (0,+ l), (-1,+ I), (-2,+2), (+2,+5), (-5,+5), (-10, 10), (-42,-1),
(0,+126), where day 0 is the announcement day.
The long-term abnormal returns indicated by the BHARs are computed over the
event window from the 12 months before the acquisition to 36 months after. We also
design 4 event windows out of entire 48 month study period, including (-12,0), (0,12),
(0,24), and (0,36) for our long-term study.
4.2.2 Measurement of Short-term Abnormal Stock Returns
CARs are calculated for each acquiring firm based on daily abnormal returns in
accordance with a standard event study methodology (Brown & Warner, 1980). To
analyze abnormal stock returns we employ the market model as the benchmark model
given by:
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Rit = ai+ßiRmt + eit (3)
Where Rit is the daily return for stock / on day t, Rmt is the daily value-weighted
market return on day t, a¡ and /?, are parameters, and eit is the error term. The parameters
are obtained based on the return data during the 253 days period which begins 380 days
and ends 127 days prior to the announcement date. Thus, the abnormal return for stock i
on day t is calculated as:
ARit = Rit - («i + ßiRmt) (4)
Where (a.i+ßiRmt) stands for the expected normal return on stock i on day t,
denoted as E(Rit). Accordingly, the abnormal return for stock /' on day t can be rewritten
as:
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) (5)
The CAR for each firm is the sum of the daily abnormal returns across t days
during the entire event period from day -42 to day +126, denoted as:
CARiT = ^l=iARit (6)
4.2.3 Measurement of Long-term Abnormal Stock Returns
BHAR is used to measure the abnormal stock returns of acquiring firms (Barber
& Lyon, 1997) in the long-term market performance study. For the sample firms, the
abnormal return is calculated as:
ARit = Rit-E(Rit) (7)
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Where Ruis the monthly return for stock i in month t, E(Rit) is the expected return
in month t. For our study of long-term abnormal performance, we consider the market
index, Rmh as the expected return for each sample firm.
Different from the calculation of CARs, BHAR for each firm is measured as the
difference between the return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample stock and the
return on a buy-and-hold investment in a benchmark portfolio, the market index, across t
months.
BHARit = ??=?[1 + Rit] - ??=?[1 + E(Rmt)] (8)
4.2.4 Measurement of Operating Performance
In this study, operating performance is measured by profitability and sales
growth. Healy et al. (1992) and Ghosh (2001) apply indicators such as return on asset
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and profit margin to define profitability. In this study, we
measure acquiring firm's profitability using these measures which are defined as follow.
ROA is computed as:
__. _ Earnings Before Interest and Taxes ^qn
Total Value of Assets
ROE is calculated as:
ROE= NetIncome (10)
Shareholders' Equity
Profit Margin is defined as:
? c-^\n ¦ NetIncome ?? 1?Profit Margin = (11)Revenue
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In addtion, since firm growth can reflect a firm's long-term cash flow generation
ability and is positively related to firm performance, we include firms' sales growth as an
indicator of firm performance, which is defined as the annual sales growth rate:
„ . _ ,_, (Current Year's Sales-Last Year's Sales) ????/ /i<->\Sales Growth = r— * 100% (12)Last Year s Sales
Lins (2003) finds that capital structure has a significant impact on firm
performance in emerging markets. Thus, we employ the leverage ratio which reflects a
firm's debt capacity, as an indirect indicator of firm performance and measure it as:
T Long Term Debt+Current Liabilities /·?->\Leverage = ; (13)° Total Assets
4.2.5 Cross-sectional Analysis of Market Performance
We use an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model to analyze the relation
between the CARs and a firm's pre-acquisition performance, changes in leverage and
deal characteristics. The regressions are conducted on the three days CAR (-1,+I) and the
five day CAR (-2,+2) as a dependent variable in model 1 and model 2, respectively.
As discussed above, variables which indicate a firm's performance and debt
capacity are denoted as ROA, ROE, Profi Margin, Sales Growth and Leverage. The
acquiring firm's performance before the acquisition is denoted by variables such as Pre-
ROA, Pre-ROE, Pre-Profit Margin, and Pre-Sales Growth in the OLS regression model.
Besides, we denote changes in leverage as Dif leverage. We also test the effects ofROA,
ROE and Profit Margin on the abnormal returns seperately.
To analyze the effect of M&A characteristics on the market performance of
acquiring firms, we include deal-related control variables as dummy variables in the
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analysis. First, if both the acquiring firm and the target firm are in the same industry, the
same industry dummy variable denoted as Same-Industry equals 1, otherwise it is 0.
Second, if the acquiring firm is a state-owned firm, the SOEs dummy variable denoted as
SOE is 1, otherwise it is 0. Third, if the form of payment in the M&A transaction is cash,
then the cash dummy variable denoted as Cash equals 1 , while 0 represents other forms
of payment. Fourth, the cross-border dummy is 1 if it is a cross-border deal, otherwise it
is 0. Fifth, we denote Friendly as a dummy variable in the analysis which equals 1 if the
bidder's attitude to the deal is friendly, otherwise it equals 0. Sixth, the Private (target)
dummy is 1 if the target is a privately owned firm. Seventh, the JV (target) dummy is 1 if
the target is a Joint-Venture, otherwise it is 0.
Finally, we measure the firm value of acquiring firms as the logarithm of the
firms' market value from the announcement year denoted as Firm Value in the regression
model.
Thus, the multivariate regression models with CAR (-2,+2) as a dependent
variable are:
Model 1.1
CAR(-2,+2)i = as + P1P^ROAj + ß2Pre_Sales Growth¡ + ß3Dif_Leveragei +
ß4Firm_Valuei + ß5BHAR(-12,0)i + ß6Same_Industryi + ß7S0Ej + ß8Cashj +




CAR(-2,+2)i = a¡ + ßjPre.ROEj + ß2Pre_Sales Growth¡ + ß3Dif_Leveragei +
ß4Firm_Valuei + ß5BHAR(-12,0)j + ß6Same_Industryj + ß7S0Ej + ßgCashj +




a¡ + ß1Pre_Margin Profitj + ß2Pre_Sales Growthj + ß3Dif_Leveragej +
ß4Firm_Valuei + ß5BHAR(-12,0){ + ß6Same_Industryj + ß7S0Ej + ß8Cashj +
ßgCross_Borderj + ß10Friendlyi + ß^PrivateCtarge^i + ß12JV(target)i + s¡ (16)
The Regression models for CAR (-1,+I) are:
Model 2.1
CAR(-1, +l)j = ai + ß^re.ROAj + ß2Pre_Sales Growthj + ß3Dif_Leveragej +
ß4Firm_Valuej + ß5BHAR(-12,0)j + ß^amejndustryj + ß7S0Ej + ß8Cashj +




CAR(-l,+l)i = Oj + ß^re.ROEi + ß2Pre_Sales Growthj + ß3Dif_Leveragej +
ß4Firm_Valuei + ß5BHAR(-12,0)i + ß6Same_Industryi + ß7SOEj + ß8Cashj +
ßgCross_Borderj + ß10Friendlyi + ß1;LPrivate(target)i + ß12JV(target)j + s¡
(18)
Model 2.3
CAR(-l,+l)i = a. + ßaPre_Margin Profiti + ß2Pre_Sales Growthj +
ß3Dif_Leveragei + ß4Firm_Valuei + ß5BHAR(-12,0)j + P6Same_Industry¡ +





5.1. Results of Short-term Shareholder Wealth Effects
In this section, we carriy out the empirical analysis of the stock price data using
standard event study methodology to assess the impact of M&A announcements on the
market value of acquring firms.
Table 3 presents the results of an analysis of shareholder's wealth effects around
the M&A announcement date. CARs of event windows (-5,-2), (-2,0), (-1,0), (0,), (0,+l),
(-1,+I), (-2,+2), (+2,+5), (-5,+5), (-10,+1O), (-42,-1), (0,+ 126), (-42,+ 126) are reported
in the third column in Panel A. The days in the event window refer to trading days
relative to the announcement day (day 0). The second column describes the number of
observations used in each event windows; the fourth column presents the Patell Z value
and the fifth and sixth columns present the number of positive CARs against negative
CARs and the sign test value, respectively.
Panel A displays the event study results for the whole sample. The mean CAR
after the announcement is -0.69% for a period of two days to five days after the
announcement day (+2,+5), and -2.52% for 126 days (6 months) after the announcement,
which are not significantly different from zero. By contrast, the CARs during a three-day
event window (-1,+ I) and a five-day event window (-2,+2) are 0.67% and 0.74% and are
statistically significant. Similarly, CARs are significantly positive over the event
windows (-5,+5), (-10,+ 1O) with 0.19%) and 0.79%>, respectively.
On the other hand, CARs during periods prior to the announcement are 0.24% for
the event window (-5,-2), 0.58%) for the event window (-2,0) and 0.37% for the two-day
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window (-1,0), which are significantly positive. Similar results are reported over the
event window (-42,-1). Since the magnitude of the gains is quite small over the (-42,-1)
window, evidence suggests that acquiring firms experience a large portion of run-up
occurred from two days to one day prior to the announcement date.
Overall, the empirical evidence from the full sample suggests that shareholders of
Chinese acquiring firms realize significant postive CARs surrounding the announcement
date and do not lose wealth within 6 months after the M&A announcement. That is to
say, shareholders of acquring firms benefit from their firms' M&A announcement in the
short term. The generalized sign test further reinforces our results for all event periods.
Our finding is consistent with the M&A studies on Chinese acquiring firms (Chi et al.,
2009) and Janpanese evidence (e.g. Kang et al., 2000; Van Schaik et al., 2004). However,
our finding is contrary to most Western evidence on the wealth effects of M&As which
document that acquiring firms do not realize a positive abnormal return during the event
period (e.g. Dodd, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Next, we examine whether our results stay robust with respect to the different
deal-specific characteristics as well as firm-specific features which are conveyed along
with the announcements. To test the impact for different groups, we conduct the same
kind of assessment for market reaction by event studies on the acquiring firms partitioned
into groups by form of payment, using cash only or stock only, bidder's attitude, friendly
or neutral, and type of deals, domestic or cross-border, acquiring firm's ownership status,
SOE or non-SOE, target's status, private, joint-venture partner or subsidiaries, and form
of acquisition, acquisition of major interest, merger or acquisition of assets. Thus, the full
sample is categorized into 14 groups for our sub-group event study analysis. The
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empirical results for stock price effect of acquiring firms falling into those groups are
presented in Panel B to Panel G in Table 3. We further perform a test on the mean and
median differences across the groups discussed above. We report the p-values associated
with paired two-tailed t-statistics for mean differences and for Wilcoxon rank-sum z-
statistics for median differences in Table 4.
Our sub-group analysis suggests that the abnormal return effect of Chinese listed
firms comes mainly from the firms acquiring targets as joint-venture partners. High and
significantly positive CARs are observed in Panel F of Table 3, and are of 4.81%, 2.01%
and 1.71% over 42 days, 2 days and 1 day prior to the announcement, respectively.
Consistently, over the three-day period (-1,+I), five-day period (-2,+2) as well as an 11-
day and 21 -day period, firms acquiring joint-venture targets report CARs of 1.98%,
2.21%, 1.72% and 3.61%, respectively, and they are statistically significant. This finding
indicates that the acquisition of a joint-venture target involves a positive market reaction.
Panel B in Table 3 shows that acquiring firms using cash offers have a
significantly positive wealth effect around M&A announcement which is consistent with
the evidence we discuss for the whole sample. The evidence for cash offers indicates that,
on average, shareholders of acquiring firms realize positive returns before the
announcement date and within two days after the announcement date. On the other hand,
acquiring firms using stock exchange offers experience a negative mean abnormal return
on the announcement day (day 0), which is -0.45% and statistically significant. Similarly,
significant negative CARs are observed over the event periods (+2,+5), (-5,+5) and
(-10,+ 1O) and insignificant CARs of -3.44% over the event window (-42,-1) and -3.22%
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over the window (-5,-2). Other than that, the CARs for stock group are significantly
positive over the windows (-2,0), (-1,0), (0,1), (-1,+I), (-2,+2), (0,126), and (-42,126).
With respect to what impact the bidder's attitude has on shareholders' wealth, the
results presented in Panel C of Table 3 suggest that shareholders of firms which initiate
friendly M&A offers gain positive abnormal returns, while shareholders of firms engaged
in neutral M&A offers do not gain as a whole.
Surprisingly, as shown in Panel D (Table 3), for firms engaging in cross-border
M&As, none of the CARs over the three-day window (-1,+I), the five-day window (-
2,+2) or the 11 -day (-5,+5) and 21 -day windows (-10,+ 1O), and CARs over the pre-,
acquisition windows (-5,-2), (-2,0), (-1,0), (-42,-1) show significant abnormal returns.
Overall, based on our cross-border M&A sample we conclude that shareholders of
acquiring firms initiating cross-border M&As experience a normal rate of return. The
indistinguishable market performance of the cross-border group is inconsistent with our
expectation that cross-border M&As create value for Chinese acquiring firms (Boateng et
al., 2008). One possible explanation for our result may be that cross-border M&As by
Chinese firms that mainly take place in recent years may be politically motivated rather
than motivated by shareholder wealth maximization. To our knowlegde, firms in
emerging markets which intend to acquire firms in developed markets tend to suffer a
loss in the beginning. Therefore, it is possible that investors do not consider the M&A
event as being positively related to the firm's future performance. Again, the sample size
of cross-border deals (15) is too small to make any meaningful inferences. On the other
hand, the market reacts positively to firms involved in domestic takeovers. As shown in
Panel D, CARs are positive across all event windows (-1,+ I), (-2,+2), (-5,+5), (-10,+ 1O)
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with returns of 0.66%, 0.72%, 0.22%, and 0.9%, respecitively, which are all significant at
the 0.001 level. Furthermore, the sign test results reinforce this finding. Therefore, we
conclude that the results are mostly driven by the domestic sample. The evidence for the
domestic group shown in Panel D indicates that investors view M&A activities innitiated
by acquiring firms with targets located in mainland China favourably. It appears that a
great deal of Chinese acquiring firms involved in the acquisition of domestic targets
expand their market share and gain greater economies of scale by either successfully
turning around bad performaning targets or better integrating targets into the operations
of merged firms. For example, TCL, China's first television and mobile phone
manufacturer, is recognized as a successful firm in domestic M&A, which has made
several acquisitions of bad performing television manufacturers but successfully turned
them around and integrated them into its operating system. However, when it comes to
cross-border M&As, statistics show that the post-acquisition integration practice of most
Chinese participants has not turned out as expected. Therefore, cross-border M&As have
proven to be more challenging for Chinese acquiring firms. Therefore, our finding, to
some extent, represents the common evidence for Chinese M&As development status.
To answer our proposed question whether the market reacts more favorably to
acquiring firms which are SOEs than non-SOEs, the short-term analysis is shown in
Panel E of Table 3. In general, shareholders of SOEs gain positive stock returns around
M&A announcements. In particular, shareholders realize CARs of 0.33% and 0.20% over
2 days (-2,0) and 1 day (-1,0) prior to the announcement, respectively, and of 0.15% over
1 day (0,1) after the announcement, which are highly significant. On the other hand, non-
SOEs realize a normal return associated with their M&A announcement on the whole.
4 1
The results of an event study on non-SOEs show that (Panel E), Shareholders of non-
SOEs only realize a CAR of 1.19% over 2 days prior to the announcement and 2.95%
over 10 days prior and 10 days after the announcement, both being statistically
significant.
Looking across the subgroup of form of acquisition in Panel G of Table 3, a
consistent result is found that acquiring firms realize positive abnormal returns around the
announcement day. The event window (-1,+I) shows that firms making acquisition of
major interests, merger and making acquisition of assets generate CARs of 0.49%, 0.60%
and 1 .60%, respectively, which are significant.
To conclude, our analysis of shareholders' short term wealth effects associated
with M&A announcements in China suggests that there is a positive announcement effect
in terms of abnormal stock returns. In other words, M&A activities increase shareholder
value in the short term, particularly before and around the announcement. Mergers and
acquisitions are value maximizing investment decisions for acquiring firms and are
maximizing shareholder wealth in the short term. Moreover, the difference of wealth
impacts of cash or stock payments, and of domestic or cross-border deals is insignificant
in Chinese acquisition market. In contrast, we find that the evidence of the wealth effect
for bidder's attitude is distinguishable in China. The announcements of friendly takeovers
generates higher returns for shareholders of acquirers than neutral takeovers do.
Meanwhile, in China, there is little evidence that M&As by SOE acquirers bring about
higher and positive returns compared with those by non-SOE acquirers. Furthermore, our
findings indicate that acquisitions of joint-venture targets are the most profitable M&As
for Chinese acquiring firms. Accordingly, shareholders of firms in acquisitions of joint
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venture targets realize the highest gains among others associated with the M&A
announcement.
Panel A of Table 4 shows results for a series of mean and median difference tests
for CARs between cash offers and stock exchange offers. In general, the market does not
react more favarably to acquiring firms using cash offers than those using stock exchange
offers. As a whole, the Chinese evidence of market reaction to different methods of
payment in M&A deals is inconsistent with the findings of Travlos (1987) which report
that shareholders of acquiring firms using stock offers suffer negative abnormal stock
returns one day before and upon the announcement date. It is possible that the sample
size of stock payment firms is too small to make an explicit conclusion. Results of means
and medians difference tests between SOEs and non-SOEs acquirers (Panel B) provide
some weak evidence that median CARs of SOE acquirers over a period of 1 day after the
announcement is larger than that of non-SOE acquirers. Therefore, we conclude that there
is no significant difference in stock abnormal returns between SOE acquirers and non-
SOEs acquirers surrounding the M&A announcement. In addition, the result of mean
difference tests of CARs between friendly deals and neutral deals shows that mean CARs
of friendly deals are significantly higher than those of neutral deals which further
confirms our finding that friendly offers are favored by investors and bring about higher
stock returns to acquiring firms associated with the announcement.
5.2. Results for the Long-term Performance of Acquiring Firms
In this section, we analyze the long term performance of acquiring firms in the
post-acquisition period using both an event study method and accounting method. We
report the results of shareholders' wealth effect over 36 months (3 years) following the
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announcement month in Table 5. We also report the results for the subsamples based on
method of payment, acquirer's status and bidder's attitude in Table 6.
Next, we display a comprehensive analysis of the changes in operating
performance of acquiring firms for six years around the M&A announcement year (from
3 years before to 3 years after the announcement year). The results are reported in Table
7, 8 and 9, respectively.
5.2.1 Results of Event Study Analysis
Table 5 presents the BHARs to acquirer shareholders over five holding periods,
(-12,0), (0,0), (0,12), (0,24), and (0,36). For example, -12 denotes 12 months prior to the
announcement month (month 0), and +12 denotes 12 months after the announcement
month. BHAR is computed as the average compounded abnormal return across each
event period.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that for the full sample, acquirer shareholders, on
average, gain a 16.04% abnormal return during the pre-acquisition period (-12,0) and
18.25%, 37.97%, and 88.21% abnormal returns over the post-acquisition periods (0,+12),
(0,+24), and (0,+36), respectively. These compounded abnormal returns during 1 year
period, 2-year period and 3-year period are highly significant.
Analysis of sub-groups shows that, cash acquirers outperform stock acquirers
over the long term (Panel B) and friendly acquirers realize higher abnormal returns than
neutral acquirers (Panel C). The evidence of long term shareholders' gains is contrary to
that of shareholders' wealth effects in the short term when we classify the sample by SOE
acquirers and non-SOE acquirers. Panel D displays that shareholders of SOE acquirers as
44
well as non-SOE acquirers earn significant positive gains following the announcement
year. Over the 24 month and 36 month post-acquisition periods, we also find that cross-
border acquirers realize 239.17% and 232.76% abnormal returns, respectively, that are
significant at the 0.1 level and higher. Overall, none of the average BHARs reported in
Table 5 are negative in the long term following the M&A announcement.
The results for our mean and median difference tests are shown in Table 6. We
find that there is no significant difference in the long term wealth effect between cash and
stock payment (Panel A), SOE and non-SOE acquirers (Panel B), and friendly and
neutral deals (Panel C). We thus conclude that, although there is no distinguishable
difference across various characteristics of deals, Chinese acquiring firms, on average,
outperform the stock market and create positive or normal stock returns for shareholders
who buy and hold the stock over the three years following the M&A announcement.
However, the results for the long-term stock return performance are, in general, contrary
to those reported for developed markets.
5.2.2 Results of Post-Acquisition Operating Performance
While a vast majority of studies of long term post-performance focus on the long
term stock price effects related to M&As (e.g. Agrawal et al., 1992; Anderson and
Mandelker, 1993; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Bradley and Sundaram, 2004), few studies
have examined the changes in operating performance associated with a firm's M&A
activities (e.g. Healy et al., 1992; Ghosh, 2001). In this study, to further investigate
whether mergers and acquisitions provide benefits to Chinese acquiring firms in the long
term, we study the changes in operating performance of acquiring firms before and after
acquisitions.
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We apply firms' accounting data to analyze whether acquirers show better
operating performance following acquisitions in terms of changes in profitability and
sales growth. For the analysis of acquiring firm's profitably, we use three different
financial ratios, ROA, ROE and Profit Margin. We also measure changes in a firm's
leverage (debt to total assets) in order to analyze the changes in the firm's debt capacity.
In Table 7, we provide a statistical summary of the data on profitability and
growth for the different indicators (ROA, ROE, Profit Margin and Sales Growth) for a 6-
year period. Panel A shows that ROE, Profit Margin and Sales Growth decline from year
-3 to year -1 in the pre-acquisition period relative to the announcement year (year O), and
jumps back up in the announcement year. Then, following the acquisition, Profit Margin
and Sales Growth show a further decline from year +1 to year +2 in the post-acquisition
period. In contrast, the leverage ratio displays a decline in the pre-acquisition period but
increases gradually from the announcement year and beyond.
In Table 8, we provide results for a t-test with respect to mean differences and for
a z-test with respect to median differences of financial variables (ROA, ROE, Profit
Margin, Sales Growth and Leverage) averaged over three years post-acquisition and
averaged over three years pre-acquisition for the full sample as well as the sub-samples.
The results of overall firm performance in terms of profitability and growth, on average,
do not show that Chinese acquiring firms realize an improvement in operating
performance after mergers and acquisitions. In particular, profitability decreases
following acquisitions. As shown in Panel A, mean ROA in the post-acquisition period
(1.58%) is significantly lower compared with that in pre-acquisition period (3.45%). On
the other hand, the debt of acquiring firms increases after acquisitions with both the mean
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and median difference being significant. In summary, our results on performance and
leverage changes over the long term suggest that acquiring firms perform poorly or no
better after acquisitions than they do before acquisitions, as shown by decreased
profitability, whereas the financial leverage of acquring firms increases significantly after
the acquisition.
A further breakdown across sub-samples displays similar evidence as the full
sample. When analyzing SOEs vs. non-SOEs (Panel B), the use of cash payment vs.
stock payment (Panel C), and domestic or cross-border acquisitions (Panel D), results are
consistent with those for the full sample. Consistently, across various sub-samples,
leverage increases following the acquisition.
Overall, our findings on post-acquisition operating performance are consistent
with earlier research on the post-acquisition performance in the US that shows that
acquirers do not seem to improve their operating performance in the post-acquisition
period. For example, in a recent study, Ghosh (2001), reports that firm performance
shows no significant improvement after the acquisition when applying industry-adjusted
data of three years before and three years after the transaction. Our finding is consistent
with studies on operating performance of Chinese acquiring firms that performance
improves only in the announcement year and then declines in the following years (Wang,
2007). Chinese acquirers involved in cross-border M&As realize a higher sales growth
rate followed by M&As compared with that of domestic acquirers. In some respects, this
is consistent with the thoery that conglomerate acquisitions are more likely induced by
the goal of growth maximization (Halpern, 1983). Our finding that acquisitions lead to
financial leverage changes is consistent with the U.S. evidence documented by Ghosh
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and Jain (2000). They find that financial leverage increases significantly following
mergers.
5.3. Results of Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this section, we examine the effects of Chinese firm-specific factors and deal-
specific characteristics on abnormal returns around the announcement date. The results
are presented in Table 9.
Model 1.1 through 1.3 (as well as Models 2.1 through 2.3) employ ROA, ROE
and Profit Margin, respectively, for the pre-acquisition period. In each model, ROA, ROE
and Profit Margin has a negative effect on abnormal returns around the announcement,
and is significant at the 10% level. According to the agency theory of Jensen (1986),
managers of firms with substantial free cash flow are likely to overinvest in projects
which could maximize firm size or growth associated with their compensation at the
expense of the firm's shareholders. Our results, therefore, suggest that agency can be a
possible motive during Chinese acquisition.
Changes in leverage around acquisition announcements have some effects on
abnormal returns as well. As shown in Model 2.1 through 2.3, DifLeverage is positively
related to abnormal returns associated with M&As announcements, and is significant at
the 10% level or better.
As for the same industry effect on abnormal returns, some evidence from Chinese
M&As shows that if acquirers and targets belong to the same industry, according to the
market power theory by Chatterjee (1986), the synergy effect for the combined firm
would increase shareholders' value.
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As shown in Table 9, friendly M&As are robust from all regressions. As friendly
acquisitions are viewed as positive events due to their low transaction cost, shareholders
are likely to benefit from friendly acquisitions.
There is some evidence in Chinese M&As that the acquisition of private targets
may result in a value decline for shareholders. However, this finding is inconsistent with
that reported by Fuller et al. (2002). They find that firms acquiring private firms realize
higher abnormal returns than acquiring public firms associated with M&A
announcements. One reason is that since the data accessibility is limited for private firms,
investors are concerned that it is challenging for acquirers to make appropriate
estimations on the performance of private firms. On the other hand, in our case, acquiring
a joint-venture target has a significant positive effect on abnormal returns around the
announcement. As a strategic entity, a joint venture was advantages over other business
entities in, for example, greater resources in terms of staff and technology and greater
business opportunities. Thus, the profit, resources and business opportunities of joint
venture targets are likely to be transferred to the combined firm if they are acquired.
Accordingly, shareholders of acquiring firms are likely to experience gains as well.
However, the results of Table 9 show that cash payments in M&A activities have
no significant effect on abnormal returns which is inconsistent with the Western findings
that acquirers offering cash payment experience positive abnormal returns (Travlos,
1987). Interestingly, acquirers with SOEs ownership, and acquirers engaged in cross-




This paper examines the wealth effects and operating performance of Chinese
M&As in an attempt to investigate the underlying motives behind Chinese corporate
acquisitions. By studying 437 M&A deals initiated by Chinese listed companies between
1 997 and 2007, we find that the acquiring firm shareholders earn positive excess returns
around the announcement date but that there is no significant improvement in firm
performance after the acquisition.
The main findings from this research are as follows: First, Chinese listed firms
often initiate friendly M&A offers and mostly use cash as a means of payment. Most
acquisitions are found to be made by SOEs that play a dominant role in China's capital
markets. In addition, we find that Chinese acquirers mainly acquire private targets and
subsidiaries in related industries.
Second, for the most part, Chinese M&As are viewed by investors as positive
signals. We find that acquiring firms experience positive abnormal stock returns around
the announcement date, consistent with the synergy motive. Furthermore, there is some
evidence that in the long term shareholders who buy and hold the stock of Chinese
acquiring firms for three years after acquisition realize moderately positive abnormal
returns.
Third, we find no significant improvement in the operating performance of
Chinese acquirers. This finding is consistent with US evidence (Ghosh, 2001). Our
finding that acquiring firms' operating performance improves only in the announcement
year and decreases in the post-acquisition period is consistent with some previous work
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on the Chinese acquisition market (e.g. Wang, 2007). The evidence on operating
performance is consistent with the agency and hubris hypotheses.
Finally, the cross-sectional analysis reveals that there is no significant difference
in the announcement period abnormal returns between state-owned and non state-owned
firms. In addition, we find that acquisitions by profitable acquirers and acquisitions
involving private targets have a significant negative effect on announcement returns,
while acquisitions resulting in a change of firm leverage, horizontal (related) acquisitions,
friendly acquisitions, and acquisitions of joint-venture targets have a positive effect on
announcement returns.
This study provides some early evidence on the short-term and long-term
performance of Chinese acquiring firms. The Chinese corporate control market has
grown substantially over the past decade and continues to shape the structure of specific
industries and the overall capital market in significant ways. This study has focused only
on acquirers that are publicly traded. As the acquisition market matures and data
availability improves, it would be useful to build on this research by examining the whole
spectrum of acquisition activity in this rapidly transforming market.
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Table 1: Distribution of Acquisitions by Year and by Deal Characteristics, 1997-2007
The sample consists of 437 completed control bids initiated by Chinese listed firms from 1997 through
2007. Acquisition sample is partitioned into the form of payment, bidder's ownership status, bidder's
attitude, form of acquisition, whether bidders and targets are in related or nonrelated industries and target's
public status and reported by yearly frequencies.
Panel A shows form ofpayment in four categories. Panel B presents bidder's ownership status of which
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) is defined as in which the state has control stake, otherwise it is Non State-
Owned Enterprise (Non-SOE) firm. Moreover, Panel C describes two kinds of bidder 's attitude which
appear in our sample. Panel D shows the distribution of Domestic deals of which both of acquirers and
targets locate in mainland China and Cross-Border deals of which targets locate in areas or countries
outside mainland China. Panel E reports three main forms of acquisition (Merger, Asset Acquisition and
Acquisition ofMajor Interests). The industrial relatedness between acquirers and targets are shown in panel
F, where acquirer and target have the same 2-digit SIC code fall into the group of related, otherwise into




1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Panel A: Form ofpayment
Cash Only 7
Stock Only 0


















































































Panel C: Bidder's attitude
Friendly 8 11 4
Neutral 0 0 0
Unspecified 0 0 0





























Panel D: Domestic and Cross-Border
Cross-border 00 1104 1602419
Domestic 8 11 3 15 10 30 71 74 45 56 95 418
Total 8 11 4 16 10 34 72 80 45 58 99 437
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Panel E: Form ofAcquisition
Merger 13 14
Asset Acquisition 2 3 13
Acquisition of 5 5 2 9
Majority Interest
Others 0 0 0 0




























Panel F: Bidder's and target's industry relatedness
Related 7 10 2 13 7 19 46 48 26 28 50 256
Unrelated 1 1 2 3 3 15 26 32 19 30 49 181
Total 8 11 4 16 10 34 72 80 45 58 99 437
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Table 3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Chinese acquiring firms
This table reports the CARs for 13 event windows for the full sample (Panel A) and for subgroups
classified by the form ofpayment (Panel B), bidder's attitude {Friendly or Neutral) in Panel C, Domestic or
Cross-border in panel D, bidders ' ownership status (SOE or Non-SOE) in Panel E, target 's status (Private,
Joint-Venture or Subsidiaries) in Panel F, and form ofacquisitions (Acquisition ofMajor Interest, Merger
or Acquisition ofAssets) in Panel G. CARs are computed from a Market Model estimated from days -379 to
-127 relative to the announcement date.
Panel A: Full sample
window Mean
CAR












































































































































































































































$, *, **, ***, denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Chinese acquiring firms (Continued)





























































































































































Panel D: Domestic vs Cross-Border
Domestic

































































































Mean Patell Z +X- Generaliz
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Table 4: Means and Medians differences in CARs between M&A subgroups
This table reports mean and median difference between M&A subgroups: Cash vs Stock (Panel A), SOE vs Non-SOE
(Panel B), and Friendly offers vs Neutral offers (Panel C). The fourth and fifth columns and the eighth and ninth








































































































































































































































































Panel C: Friendly vs Neutral
Friendly Neutral Friendly Neutral
window Mean Mean t-value Pr>|t| Median Median z-value Pr>|z|
(-5,-2) 0.25% 0.12% 0.14 0.8857 0.10% 0.12% 0.1730 0.8626
(-2,0) 0.79% -0.74% 1.56 0.1202 . 0.56% -0.42% -1.5232 0.1277
(-1,0) 0.55% -0.75% 1.46 0.1452 0.19% -0.30% -0.9152 0.3601
(0,0) 0.03% -0.19% 0.26 0.7975 -0.22% -0.14% 0.0000 1.0000
(0, + l) 0.43% -0.47% 1.03 0.3038 0.06% -0.34% -1.3838 0.1664
(-1, + I) 0.94% -1.04% 2.10 0.0368 0.37% -0.88% -1.8062 0.0709
(-2, +2) 1.16% -1.93% 2.79 0 0056 0.43% -1.39% -2.8435 0.0045
(+2,+5) -0.63% -1.14% 0.55 0.5843 -0.66% -0.22% 0.4812 0.6304
(-5, +5) 0.52% -1.99% 1.62 0.1061 0.20% -0.65% -0.4309 0.6665
(-10,+ 1O) 1.34% -2.88% 1.83 0.0677 0.38% -1.96% -1.1723 0.2411
(-42,-1) 0.50% -2.80% 1.03 0.3045 0.38% 1.28% 1.1945 0.2323
(0.+ 126) 0.30% -20.32% 2.41 0.0163 -1.63% -6.48% -1.014] 0.3106
(-42.+126) 0.78% -23.07% 2.42 0.0158 -0.24% -5.51% -0.4433 0.6576
* *# *#*, denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 levels, respectively.
66
Table 5: Long term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for Chinese acquiring firms
This table reports the BHAR from Market Adjusted Model for acquiring firms (Panel A) and BHAR for
acquiring firms classified by the form ofpayment (Panel B), bidder's attitude (Panel C), whether bidders
are SOE or not (Panel D), whether it is Domestic or Cross-Border M&A (Panel E). BHAR are computed
from Market Adjusted Model estimated from month -48 to -13 relative to the announcement month.


























































































































































































































































































$, *, **, ***, denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Means and Medians differences in BHARs between M&A subgroups
This table presents means and medians between subgroups: Cash vs Stock (Panel A), SOE vs Non-SOE
(Panel B), and Friendly offers vs Neutral offers (Panel C). The fourth and fifth columns report t-statistics
value for the difference of mean. The eighth and ninth columns report the Wilcoxon Z value for the
difference of median.
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Table 9: Results for a cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of the CARs for acquiring firms
This table reports the results of cross-sectional regressions for acquiring firms. The dependent variable is
five-day event window CAR (-2,+T) in model 1 and three-day event window CAR (-1, +1) in model 2. The
independent variables are defined as follows: ROA (in model 1.1 and model 2.1), ROE (in model 1.2 and
model 2.2), Profit Margin (in model 1.3 and 2.3) denote profitability; Sales Growth denotes annual sales








































































































































































































5 Î denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
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